A computation scheme among n parties is fair if no party obtains the computation result unless all other n − 1 parties obtain the same result. A fair computation scheme is optimistic if n honest parties can obtain the computation result without resorting to a trusted third party.
Introduction
In fair computation [1, 2] , n parties possess n pieces of information and need to output a function of these n pieces of information (the inputs) atomically. Namely, a party obtains the output of the function if and only if the other n − 1 parties obtain the same output. A prominent example is auctions: after n parties offer a price for some item, they wish to determine the highest price and the winner without ambiguity, e.g., when more than one party claims to win the item. A solution is the fair computation of the n bids (prices).
The difficulty of fair computation stems from the fact that a party might be malicious (dishonest) and try to obtain other parties' inputs, twist other parties' outputs, or arbitrarily delay other parties from obtaining an output. Still, honest parties should eventually obtain an output in a fair manner: they should all obtain the function of the n inputs, or all obtain a specific value ⊥ (denoted abort in [1] ). In fact, (deterministic) fair computation is in general impossible without a trusted third party [3] . Yet, this third party is not needed in every execution of a (deterministic) fair computation protocol.
Optimistic (deterministic) fair computation stipulates that the third party does not need to be invoked if all n parties are honest [1, 2] , [4] . An execution where n honest parties output without invoking the third party is called an optimistic execution [1] , [4] . Given that cheating is seldom and the third party is considered a bottleneck, optimism is practically appealing. To claim true practicality, however, optimistic executions should be efficient. To be specific, the number of messages exchanged among n honest parties (which compute the function without resorting to the third party) should not be prohibitive. Until the present paper, the optimal number of messages was unknown.
We prove in this paper that + 2n − 3 is the optimal number of messages that an optimistic execution of optimistic fair computation may achieve in the presence of n − 1 potentially malicious parties in an asynchronous network, where is the length of the shortest sequence that contains all permutations of n symbols as subsequences [5] . Given recent results in combinatorics [6, 7, 8, 9] , example, the decision propagation pattern is applicable for any optimistic execution, no matter whether the protocol is in a similar form as our optimal protocol or not.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our general model and defines optimistic fair computation. Section 3 presents our lower-bound on the number of messages. Section 4 presents our ( + 2n − 3)-message optimistic fair computation scheme. Section 5 discusses related work. We defer the details of the proof of our lower-bound to Appendix A and the details of the correctness proof of our message-optimal scheme to Appendix B.
Model and Definitions

The parties
We consider a set Ω of n parties P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n (sometimes also denoted by P , Q). These parties are all interactive in the sense that they can communicate with each other by exchanging messages. All parties are computationally-bounded [24] in the sense that they run in time polynomial in some security parameter s. 2 In addition to the n parties, we also assume a computationally-bounded trusted third party T . T follows the protocol assigned to it. The communication with T is such that when T is communicating with P , Q needs to wait for Q's turn to communicate with T for any two parties P, Q ∈ Ω.
At most n − 1 parties can be malicious. A malicious party could deviate arbitrarily from the protocol assigned to it. A malicious party could interact arbitrarily with the others as well as T . For example, a malicious party may drop certain messages. A party that crashes at some point in time is considered as a malicious party that drops all the messages from that point. Malicious parties may also collude (e.g., to obtain an output for themselves and to prevent an output to an honest party, i.e., to break fairness, which is defined later).
Communication channels do not modify, inject, duplicate or lose messages. Every message sent eventually reaches its destination. Any modified, injected, duplicate, or lost message is considered to be due to malicious parties. The delay on message transmission is finite but unbounded. Messages could be reordered. Communication channels are authenticated and secure such as Transport Layer Security [25] . No party can be masqueraded and no message can be eavesdropped.
Fair computation
We consider the problem of optimistic fair computation in the classical sense of [2, 1] . The problem involves a deterministic function f to be computed by the n parties. Function f is agreed upon by the n parties in advance. We assume that f takes n strings x 1 ∈ {0, 1} 1 , x 2 ∈ {0, 1} 2 , . . . , x n ∈ {0, 1} n as inputs and returns z ∈ {0, 1} z as its output.
Definition 1 (Computation).
A computation scheme for f is a collection (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ) of n algorithms. The algorithms can carry out two protocols: 3 2 Hereafter, when we say that a probability is negligible, we mean that the probability is a negligible function g(s) of the security parameter s; i.e., ∀c ∈ N, ∃C ∈ N such that ∀s > C, g(s) < 1 s c . 3 We consider deterministic protocols here (for Compute and Stop). In this paper, deterministic protocols consists of two classes of protocols: D1 and D2. In any protocol of D1, each party runs a deterministic algorithm and sends deterministic messages; and we define D2 based on D1: for any protocol π1 in class D1, we can create a protocol π2 in class D2 such that π1 and π2 are the same except for the message contents of π2 which can be randomized.
• Compute: Each party P i , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is initialized with a local input x i . If P i finishes this protocol, P i returns a local output which can take a value in {0, 1} z ∪ {⊥}. If Compute is interrupted by Stop (which we introduce below), Compute returns the same output as Stop.
• Stop: P i invokes Stop when P i wants to stop the computation. P i can invoke this protocol at any point in time. P i obtains P i 's status of Compute so far (i.e., the sequence of messages that have arrived at P i so far) as a local input to Stop. P i makes a local output which can take a value in {0, 1} z ∪ {⊥}.
In the classical definition of fair computation [2] , the problem is defined in the simulatability paradigm [26] , which basically expresses a solution to fair computation in terms of a simulation of the ideal process. In what follows, we recall the notion of the ideal process in Definition 2, and then fair computation in Definition 3.
Definition 2 (Ideal process [2] ). The ideal process for fair computation of f is a collection (P 1 ,P 2 , . . . ,P n , U ) of n + 1 algorithms. EachP i , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is initialized with a local input x i . U is parameterized by f .P i sends message a i = x i to U . Messages are delivered instantly. U returns a message m i to P i according to Equation (1) as soon as a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n have arrived at U or one message of ⊥ has arrived at U .P i outputs whatever U returns to it.
The process is ideal in the sense that among n + 1 parties, the information of a private input is only exposed to the universally trusted U , which we explain in Definition 3.
Definition 3 (Fair computation 4 ). A computation scheme α solves fair computation for f [2] if it satisfies the following properties:
• Fairness: for any e ∈ N, 1 ≤ e ≤ n − 1 and any e malicious parties P d 1 , P d 2 , . . . , P de , for any computationally-bounded algorithm A that controls the e malicious parties 5 , there exists a computationally-bounded algorithm S that controlsP d 1 ,P d 2 , . . . ,P de 6 such that for any x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , O P 1 ,P 2 ,...,Pn,A (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) and OP 1 ,P 2 ,...,Pn,S (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) are computationally indistinguishable [27, 28] ;
• Termination: If an honest party P i invokes Stop, then P i eventually outputs.
• Completeness: ∀x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , if P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n are honest and none invokes Stop, then all parties output z = f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ); if P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n are honest and some invokes Stop, then either all parties output z = f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), or all parties output ⊥.
• Non-triviality: There is at least one execution in which P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n are honest and none invokes Stop. 4 The original definition in [2] is ambiguous when all parties are honest: (1) if an algorithm A delays every message, then to ensure termination, every honest party should output ⊥ at some point in time. However, for every computationally-bounded algorithm S, the first n elements of the joint output OP 1 ,P 2 ,...,Pn,S (x1, x2, . . . , xn) are the same: z = f (x1, x2, . . . , xn). Then by the original definition, all honest parties P1, P2, . . . , Pn output z, except with negligible probability, which yields a contradiction; and (2) if in a protocol, all parties send no message and only outputs ⊥, then this protocol also matches the ideal process, which however is a trivial protocol. 5 A also plays the role of the asynchronous network as defined in Section 2. 1. 6 In the ideal process, S sees • O P 1 ,P 2 ,...,Pn,A (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) denotes the joint output of P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n , A when running α for inputs x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , and OP 1 ,P 2 ,...,Pn,S (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) denotes the joint output ofP 1 ,P 2 , . . . ,P n , S when running the ideal process for inputs x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n .
Definition 4 (Optimistic fair computation). A fair computation scheme is optimistic [1] if it satisfies the following property.
• Optimism: ∀x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , if P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n are honest and none invokes Stop, then all parties output z = f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) without interacting with T .
When P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n are honest and none invokes Stop, P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n carry out Compute only. Thus, an optimistic execution is an execution of Compute, where every party finishes all communication steps of Compute and outputs.
We focus on the class C of function f such that for any x 1 ∈ {0, 1} 1 , x 2 ∈ {0, 1} 2 , . . . , x n ∈ {0, 1} n , no computationally-bounded algorithm is able to output f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) using only n − 1 out of the n strings, except with negligible probability. 8 For a function f in the complement of C, a protocol that solves optimistic fair computation can still be vulnerable to the following attack: a subset of parties colludes, leaves with the evaluation of f immediately but an honest party outputs ⊥. In the literature [29, 30] , fair protocols for the complement of C are considered, but they ensure fairness different from Definition 2 and Definition 3, and are not the focus here. We also assume that T does not have prior knowledge of x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , and therefore no computationally-bounded algorithm, even with the help of T , is able to compute z from any n − 1 out of the n inputs of P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n . We call this assumption no prior knowledge of T .
Lower Bound
In this section, we prove our lower-bound on the number of messages exchanged during an optimistic execution of optimistic fair computation. Recall that we consider those functions that cannot be evaluated by only a subset of n parties, e.g., we do not consider constant functions. In addition, a scheme (or the Compute protocol of a scheme) which sends no message, invokes Stop and outputs ⊥ only is excluded by the non-triviality property (Definition 3). Thus the lower-bound is non-zero.
In Theorem 1, we express our lower bound in terms of n and , the length of the shortest sequence that contains all permutations of n symbols as subsequences.
Theorem 1 (Message complexity). For any function f ∈ C, for any optimistic fair computation scheme for f (for n parties, among which n − 1 can be malicious), the n parties exchange at least + 2n − 3 messages in every optimistic execution.
Proof sketch. (The full proof is in Appendix A.) To prove Theorem 1, we view every optimistic execution E as a sequence of messages ordered according to when they reach their destinations respectively. We first pinpoint two necessary messages in E, and then we show that between these two messages, there must exist certain patterns of messages.
Intuitively, when starting E, no party knows anything about other parties' inputs; there is a border-line message m * 1 such that, after m * 1 reaches its destination, one and only one party knows something about all the other parties' inputs. If any honest party P i ∈ Ω stops before m * 1 arrives at its destination, then P i is unable to output z = f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) with non-negligible probability by no prior knowledge of T .
By the end of E, every party receives sufficient messages to compute z (by the optimism property); there is another border-line message m * 2 such that, after m * 2 reaches its destination, one and only one party has sufficient messages to compute z. If any honest party P i stops after m * 2 arrives at its destination, P i outputs z by the completeness property (e.g., with the help of T , which might not be the only way and is not necessarily so for the proof). Figure 1a illustrates the two messages. Figure 1: The output of P i if P i stops at some point in execution E What P i should output if it stops between m * 1 and m * 2 requires a closer look. Suppose that when P i wants to stop, P i has not received some message m i . (We clarify some terminology here. When we say that P i has not received or does not receive some message m i , we mean that P i has not received m i but received every message with destination P i before m i in E. The same for other parties.) When P i wants to stop, either no other party has decided an output (and then P i can easily decide), or some party P j ∈ Ω, j = i has decided. If P j claims that it has not received message m j and m i is the first message with destination P i after m j in E, , then P i must adopt P j 's decision, or in other words, P j 's decision propagates to P i . Because n − 1 parties can be malicious, P i is unable to distinguish whether P j 's claim is honest or not and then P i has to decide the same output as P j (except with negligible probability) by the fairness property. Figure 1b illustrates this agreement.
This agreement between two parties induces a decision propagation pattern, which gives rise to a certain pattern of messages in E: after a message m j with destination P j , there must exist a message m i with destination P i so that P j could enforce P i on the same output if (a) P j does not receive m j , (b) P j invokes Stop and outputs ⊥, and (c) P i does not receive m i and invokes Stop. We use this decision propagation pattern to build the following scenario. Suppose one party P 1 stops before m * 1 arrives at its destination and then the other n − 1 parties stop following the decision propagation pattern above: for k = 1, we denote by m 1 the message which P 1 has not received when P 1 stops; then for k = 2, 3, . . . , n, if there is a message m k in E that is the first message with destination P k between m k−1 and m * 2 , then P k stops when P k has not received m k , and if not, P k stops after m * 2 arrives at its destination. Clearly, if the pattern of the n messages whose destinations are P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n does not exist between m * 1 and m * 2 in E, then P n would output z by the property of m * 2 . However, P 1 , as well as other parties P 2 , P 3 , . . . , P k for which messages m 2 , m 3 , . . . , m k exist, would output ⊥ by the property of m * 1 and decision propagation. This would violate the fairness property. Therefore, the pattern of the n messages whose destinations are n parties, or in fact any permutation of the n parties must exist as a subsequence of E between between m * 1 and m * 2 .
Thus, the number of messages between m * 1 and m * 2 (inclusive) of E is at least . In the meantime, in E, before m * 1 , there are at least n − 1 messages to meet the definition of m * 1 and after m * 2 , there are at least n − 2 messages to meet the definition of m * 2 . We add together the minimum numbers of messages before m * 1 , after m * 2 and between m * 1 and m * 2 , and then have + 2n − 3 as the final minimum number of messages during every optimistic execution.
An Optimal Protocol
To prove that + 2n − 3 is a tight lower bound, we describe in this section an ( + 2n − 3)-message optimistic fair computation scheme for the function that implements fair exchange of some items. This shows that the optimal message complexity can be achieved for some optimistic fair computation scheme.
Our optimal protocol relies on a publicly verifiable transcript. I.e., each destination can verify in an execution whether previous messages have arrived at their destinations correctly. This is realized by adding digital signatures [24, 31] . To help T recover the n inputs (if necessary) when some party invokes Stop, the n parties exchange verifiable encryption [12] of the n inputs in the protocol that computes without the third party. Section 4.1 recalls the basics of digital signatures and verifiable encryption, before describing our optimal protocol.
Preliminaries
We denote a digital signature on message m by σ = Sig sk (m), and the verification algorithm by V er pk (σ, m), where pk is a public key and sk is the corresponding secret key. Sometimes we denote the signature of party P i , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} simply by Sig i (m).
A digital signature scheme is secure if no adversary is able to forge a signature even after seeing polynomially many valid signatures. See [24, 31] for a discussion on digital signature schemes and their levels of security.
A verifiable encryption scheme is a recovery algorithm D and a two-party protocol between prover P and verifier V [12] . To run the two-party protocol, P and V 's common inputs are public key vk, public value x, condition κ and binary relation R; P takes witness w as an extra input. At the end of the protocol, if (x, w) / ∈ R, V rejects and outputs ⊥; if V accepts, then V obtains string α such that D(sk, κ, α) = w and (x, w) ∈ R.
We denote an instance of verifiable encryption by V E(vk, κ, w, x, R). Roughly speaking, a verifiable encryption scheme is secure if no malicious verifier is able to learn w without sk and no malicious prover is able to make V acceptα which givesŵ by D but (x,ŵ) / ∈ R, except with negligible probability. See [12] for a formal definition of security for verifiable encryption schemes. 
Protocol description
In this section, we prove that the lower-bound of + 2n − 3 messages is tight (Theorem 2) and we show the tightness in a constructive way.
Theorem 2.
There exists an optimistic fair computation scheme for some function f where n honest parties can evaluate f after they exchange exactly + 2n − 3 messages without resorting to T (i.e., in every optimistic execution).
Algorithm 1 Compute π
Require: a sequence i of length l that contains all the permutations of {1, 2, . . . , n} Ensure: (l + 2n − 3)-message Compute π 1: Build sequence j:
where (a) j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j n−2 , i 1 are n − 1 different symbols; and (b) i l , j n+l−1 , j n+l , . . . , j l+2n−3 are n different symbols.
and
We build our protocol with Compute π (Algorithm 1) and Stop µ (Algorithm 2) given any sequence that contains all the permutations of {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let l be the length of the sequence. We then show in Theorem 3 that our protocol is an (l +2n−3)-message optimistic fair computation scheme for the following function:
where R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n are n relations that allow non-interactive construction of verifiable encryption and a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n are n public values. 9 R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n , a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n are included in the public description of f . The one-time setup of the protocol is not included in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. Before π and µ are carried out, a one-time setup (a) distributes necessary keys: T 's public key vk T and secret key sk T , n parties' public and secret keys correctly; (b) distributes the public description of f correctly; and (c) executes the one-time setup of the verifiable encryption. (If implemented, a trusted party Certificate Authority [32] can do this one-time setup.) Some remarks on µ are in order: (a) as each part of the request message is publicly verifiable, T is able to efficiently verify whether a party P 's request and P 's claim are consistent by following Equation (2); and (b) P may invoke Stop at any point in time 10 , e.g., when a message received by Algorithm 2 Stop µ Require: sequence j of length l + 2n − 3 built for π Ensure: Stop µ that accompanies π 1: For any k ∈ {0, 1 . . . , l + 2n − 3}, P j k invokes µ when P j k wants to stop in π; otherwise, if π has not started, the n parties output ⊥, or if π has finished, the n parties output (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ). 2: For k = 0, when invoking µ, if P j k has not sent m k , P j k quietly leaves π and µ and outputs ⊥. 3: For 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, when invoking µ, if P j k has not received m k−1 correctly, P j k quietly leaves π and µ and outputs ⊥.
when I k = ∅ and let last k = 0 when I k = ∅, and define m −1 as an empty string. Then, for n ≤ k ≤ l + 2n − 3, when invoking µ, if P j k has not received m k−1 correctly and has received m last k −1 , then P j k sends to T message req k = m last k . By sending req k , P j k claims that P j k does not receive m k−1 . 5: T verifies that req k is consistent with P j k 's claim; and T calculates response
if req k and P j k 's claim are not consistent or P j k has sent a request before
T updates progress (which is initialized to 0) to k if k > progress, req k and P j k 's claim are consistent and P j k has not sent a request before. T then sends resp to P j k . 6: P j k outputs ⊥ if resp ="aborted"; and P j k outputs z if resp = z. P in π is incorrect, or when P is impatient while waiting for some message; our protocol allows every party to define their own strategy of invoking Stop, independent of the other n − 1 parties.
We prove that this protocol (consisting of π and µ), given a shortest permutation sequence, is an ( + 2n − 3)-message optimistic fair computation scheme (of which the proof is deferred to Appendix B). This implies Theorem 2. Combined with Theorem 1, + 2n − 3 is thus a tight lower-bound on the number of messages for optimistic fair computation.
Theorem 3. Given a sequence i of length l that contains all the permutations of {1, 2, . . . , n}, the protocol consisting of π and µ is an (l + 2n − 3)-message optimistic fair computation scheme for function f in Equation (3) in an asynchronous network with n − 1 potentially malicious parties.
In fact, function f implements fair exchange among n parties for items x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n that satisfy relations R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n . Then Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 form a compiler that can transform a shortest permutation sequence into an ( + 2n − 3)-message optimistic fair exchange scheme. An application is a message-optimal optimistic fair exchange scheme of digital signatures [1] . 11 5 Related Work
Optimistic fair computation
Cachin and Camenisch [2] formalized optimistic fair computation for two parties and a third party T (that can also be malicious). Asokan et al. [1] formalized optimistic fair exchange of digital signatures between two parties and T (where T is honest). In this paper, we assume that T is honest. We briefly compare here the two definitions above. Cachin and Camenisch [2] formalized fair computation using the simulatability paradigm [26] , while Asokan et al. [1] formalized fair exchange through games [24] . As the former can provide stronger security guarantee, we follow the definition of fair computation in [2] . Both formalizations consider the termination property in an asynchronous setting. We model this property using Stop, which is equivalent to the signal of termination in [1] . Asokan et al. [1] also defined the completeness property regarding the case where all parties are honest, while there is an ambiguity regarding this case in [2] . We adapt the definition of the completeness property from [1] . The optimism property was defined differently in [1] and [2] . In [2] , the trusted party does not communicate with the n parties when n parties are honest and messages are delivered instantly, whereas in [1] , the trusted party does not communicate with the n parties, when n parties are honest but the asynchronous network is allowed to deliver messages arbitrarily. We adopt the optimism property from [1] , as it provides a stronger guarantee. Following Asokan et al.'s work [1] , Küpçü and Lysyanskaya [33] defined optimism similarly in games.
In addition, we include the non-triviality property to rule out trivial protocols that send no message and abort all the time. (Our proof of the lower-bound is based on the existence of at least one optimistic execution guaranteed by non-triviality and optimism, but our fair computation scheme, on the other hand, allows arbitrarily many optimistic executions.)
Optimistic fair exchange
For two parties, Asokan et al. [1] proposed a 4-message optimistic fair exchange scheme that ensures termination. Since = 3 for two parties, our Theorem 1 shows that the 4-message fair exchange scheme is optimal for two parties. This also implies that a 3-message fair exchange scheme does not meet all of the required properties. For example, the optimistic fair exchange scheme proposed in [4] was criticized by Asokan et al. [1] as not ensuring termination. Another example is Ateniese's 3-message optimistic fair exchange scheme [34] , which also does not ensure termination as noted by the author himself [34] . A recent follow-up work [35] has the same drawback.
To the best of our knowledge, up to this paper (and our our fair computation scheme), no message-optimal optimistic fair exchange or optimistic fair computation scheme among n parties for an arbitrary n (with n − 1 potentially malicious parties) has been proposed.
Optimal optimistic schemes
We explain here the relation between the optimal efficiency of optimistic schemes of related problems and our optimal message efficiency. Pfitzmann, Schunter, and Waidner (PSW) [16] determined the optimal efficiency of fair two-party contract signing, Schunter [17] determined the optimal efficiency of fair two-party certified email, whereas Dashti [18] determined the optimal efficiency of two-party fair exchange in the crash-recovery model with no amnesia [36] . None of these results implies our Theorem 1, even only for n = 2. For PSW's result as well as Schunter's result, this is because there signature scheme [1] , and each of the first n messages of π is appended with an image of θ such that its pre-image produces a correct signature.
is no reduction of the problem of fair computation to the problem of fair contract signing 12 or fair certified email; for Dashti's result, this is because our model can be considered as the Byzantine failure model [36] , and is thus stronger than the model considered by Dashti. Our proof of the lower-bound, together with our message-optimal scheme, can be applied to prove that + 2n − 3 is the optimal message efficiency of fair n-party contract signing in the model of PSW. The special case where n = 2 can be used to prove PSW's result, while PSW's proof was, unfortunately, flawed.
Draper-Gil et al. [37] determined the minimal message complexity of contract signing schemes with weak fairness on four topologies. Weak fairness implies that the honest parties might have different outputs as long as they can prove their honest behavior. On the contrary, our optimal message efficiency + 2n − 3 applies to any topology, and employs a stronger fairness definition than [37] . Thus their result does not imply our Theorem 1 and vice versa.
The shortest permutation sequence
Mauw, Radomirović and Dashti (MRD) [13] proved that the optimal number of messages of totallyordered fair contract signing schemes 13 falls between + n − 1 and + 2n − 3. Later, Mauw and Radomirović (MR) [15] generalized the result of MRD to DAG-ordered fair contract signing schemes 14 . Both [13] and [15] considered fair contract signing as fair exchange of digital signatures. They use a model different from PSW, and fall within the coverage of our Theorem 1. Neither MRD's result nor MR's result implies our Theorem 1. Neither allows arbitrarily interleaved messages as our Theorem 1; instead, they assume that communication steps are either totally ordered or ordered following a directed acyclic graph (DAG). In addition, both results [13, 15] propose a range of the optimal efficiency for fair exchange, instead of a concrete lower-bound for fair computation in general (as does our Theorem 1).
It is important to note that our Theorem 1 is not a generalization of MRD's result nor of MR's result. What MRD or MR count are the messages sent from some signer. This makes the proof difficult to extend: after a message m leaves its source s, due to the asynchronous network, m does not help s's knowledge about other parties' possible states. Thus m should not help s reach an agreement if s wants to stop after sending m, unless the messages after m are defined and ordered in advance. On the contrary, what we count throughout our proof are the messages received (or not) at a destination d, which affects d's stop event. This is the key in our case for not requiring any ordering.
Another crucial concept used by MRD is the idea of an idealized protocol. An idealized protocol is informally defined as a totally-ordered fair exchange protocol of which the number of messages in an optimistic execution is optimal [13] . (Here a protocol is equivalent as a Compute protocol in our Definition 1. The communication with a third party T is not considered as part of the protocol.) At the end phase of the idealized protocol, each of the n signers is supposed to send exactly one message [13] . It is not clear yet whether the assumption can be justified or not: the main theorem in [13] relates the end of an idealized protocol with part of the shortest permutation sequence; however, (the form of the end of) the shortest permutation sequence is still open for a large n [5] . This also leads to a non-optimal fair exchange protocol in [13] and a non-optimal protocol compiler in [14] which generates a protocol specification of an optimistic fair contract signing scheme given a shortest permutation sequence. 15 Compared with MRD's idealized protocol, our proof of Theorem 12 The main difference is that contract signing outputs a proof which binds a contract agreed in advance while computation usually does not require such binding. 13 In a totally-ordered contract signing scheme, signers execute totally-ordered communication steps; i.e., at any point in time, only one signer has sufficient messages to calculate and send the next message.
14 In a DAG-ordered contract signing scheme, communication steps can be ordered in a directed acyclic graph. 15 Although [14] proved that the resulting protocol needs at least + 2n − 3 messages in an optimistic execution, 1 shows that, at the end of an optimal protocol, each of the n parties may receive exactly one message, and moreover, the end of an optimal protocol is not related to the shortest permutation sequence. We believe that this has further implications on the design of correct and efficient fair computation protocols.
A Appendix. Proof of Theorem 1
We give a detailed proof of Theorem 1. First, we give the (weak) fairness property that we use repeatedly in the proof.
Lemma 1.
For any e ∈ N, any 1 ≤ e ≤ n − 1, any e malicious parties and any computationallybounded algorithm A that controls the e malicious parties, ∀x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , any two honest parties P i , P j , i, j, ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} output the same except with negligible probability.
We show that this property is implied the fairness property in Definition 3. Before proving the property, we give formal definitions and terminologies used in Definition 3 such as computational indistinguishability [27, 28] and negligible function. In the context of Definition 3, s is the security parameter of the fair computation scheme. Recall that in Definition 3, we say that the joint outputs O = O P 1 ,P 2 ,...,Pn,A (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) and O = OP 1 ,P 2 ,...,Pn,S (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) are computationally indistinguishable. This means that for any computationally-bounded algorithm D (1 s , a, w, D) ,
where a = x 1 ||x 2 || · · · ||x n , w may be arbitrary auxiliary information and both O andŌ are indexed by 1 s and a.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider a computationally-bounded algorithm A that does not control P i or P j . I.e., both P i and P j are honest as in the statement of Lemma 1. Note that although A controls the rest of the parties, A can be an arbitrary algorithm, including running the rest of the parties honestly (and thus the proof applies to any execution as in the statement of Lemma 1.) Let o i , o j be the random variables that represent P i and P j 's outputs in the joint output O respectively. Suppose that A controls e, 1 ≤ e ≤ n − 1 malicious parties
By Definition 3, there exists a computationally-bounded algorithm S that controlsP d 1 ,P d 2 , . . . , P de such that O andŌ are computationally indistinguishable. Letō i andō j be the random variables that representP i andP j 's outputs in the joint outputŌ respectively. Since S does not controlP i orP j ,ō i =ō j with probability 1.
Consider a computationally-bounded algorithm D that tries to distinguish O andŌ as follows. where a = x 1 ||x 2 || · · · ||x n and w is an empty string. Sinceō i =ō j with probability 1, P r[D(1 s , a, w,Ō) = 1] = 1. Let ρ be the probability such that o i = o j . Then P r[D(1 s , a, w, O) = 1] = ρ. Thus ρ = 1 − negl(s). I.e., for any algorithm A, any two honest parties P i , P j , i, j, ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} output the same except with negligible probability.. Then, we discuss some essential properties/convention of Stop, which we use later in the proof. Preliminaries. If P invokes Stop several times, Stop returns the same value as the first time.
P may communicate with T in Stop, but P does not communicate with T in Compute. This is consistent to the optimism property.
When P invokes Stop, either P does not send messages to any other party including T and simply terminates, or P communicates with T and then terminates. If P communicates with T , P sends only one stop request. T does not ask any party (including P ) for additional messages when computing an output for P . This is due to the atomicity of the communication with T and the termination property.
When P communicates with T and then terminates, T sends a response only to P . In the asynchronous network, even if T sends messages to parties other than P , they might receive the messages after they complete Compute or Stop in the worst case. Thus we consider that T does not send messages to other parties.
We say that an optimistic execution E is initialized with x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , if n parties in E are initialized with x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n . When we discuss any optimistic execution E, E must have been initialized with some n strings. Thus the term E initialized with (some) x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n does not lose generality.
Sometimes we denote a party by O, P , Q, R, with an abuse of notations on O and R (as their meaning is clear in the context).
Recall the intuition (Section 3) that there are two necessary messages (of every optimistic execution). Here we precisely define the two messages and show their basic properties.
Lemma 2. For any optimistic execution E, for any two parties P and Q, we say that P contacts Q in E if one of the two properties below holds: (a) P sends m to Q in E; or (b) there exists a party O such that P contacts O and subsequently O contacts Q.
Then for any optimistic execution E and any P ∈ Ω, there exists a message m such that before m arrives at its destination, ∃Q ∈ Ω\{P } such that Q has not contacted P yet and after m arrives at its destination, ∀Q ∈ Ω\{P }, Q has contacted the destination P .
Let t be any status of P before P receives m in E. Then if P invokes Stop with t and no other party has invoked Stop, then Stop returns ⊥ to P .
Proof. The lemma contains two parts. We first prove the existence of message m.
By contradiction. Suppose that for some optimistic execution E initialized with x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n and some P ∈ Ω, after E finishes, ∃Q ∈ Ω\{P } has not contacted P yet. Then by the optimism property, P performs a computationally-bounded algorithm that computes f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) given Ω\{Q}'s inputs. A contradiction.
Second, we prove that if P invokes Stop with t and no other party has invoked Stop, then Stop returns ⊥ to P . Since no other party has invoked Stop, Stop is only able to return to P a value based on t, P 's input and T 's input. Let E be initialized with x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n . Since t is P 's status in E before P receives m, ∃Q ∈ Ω\{P } has not contacted P yet and thus t can be constructed given Ω\{Q}'s inputs. Since E is an optimistic execution, then if Stop returns a non-⊥ value, Stop returns z = f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ). Suppose that Stop returns z to P . Then there is a computationally-bounded algorithm that computes z given Ω\{Q}'s inputs and T 's inputs, which gives a contradiction. arrives at its destination, ∀P ∈ Ω, ∃Q ∈ Ω\{P } such that Q has not contacted P yet and (b) after m * 1 arrives at its destination, there exists the destination R of m * 1 such that ∀Q ∈ Ω\{R}, Q has contacted R.
Proof. The correctness follows from Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. For any optimistic execution E initialized with x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , there exists message m * 2 such that (a) before m * 2 arrives at its destination R, no P computes z = f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) from P 's status and P 's input (according to the protocol underlying E) and (b) after m * 2 arrives at R, R computes z from R's status and R's input (according to the protocol underlying E).
In E, before R receives m * 2 , ∀P ∈ Ω\{R}, P has been contacted by Q, ∀Q ∈ Ω\{P }.
Proof. The lemma contains two parts. The existence of message m * 2 follows from the optimism property.
We prove the second part by contradiction. Suppose that in E, ∃O ∈ Ω\{R}, Q ∈ Ω\{O} such that when R receives m * 2 , O has not been contacted by Q. Consider an execution F that is the same as E for the prefix that ends at the event of m * 2 arriving at its destination (inclusive); in F , after R receives m * 2 , O invokes Stop, and Stop returns before any other party invokes Stop. In F , O is honest. By Lemma 2, O outputs ⊥. However, an honest party R outputs z, which violates the completeness property. A contradiction.
Corollary 2. For any optimistic execution E, let m * 1 be defined as in Corollary 1 and let m * 2 be defined as in Lemma 3 ; then the event of m * 1 arriving at its destination precedes the event of m * 2 arriving at its destination.
Proof. The correctness follows from Lemma 3 and n ≥ 2.
Corollary 3. For any optimistic execution E, let m * 2 be defined as in Lemma 3 and let R be the destination of m * 2 ; then in E, before R receives m * 2 , ∀P ∈ Ω\{R}, P has received at least one message.
Hereafter, we present more properties about the two messages: m * 1 and m * 2 . They are always defined for any certain optimistic execution E. If it is clear in the context, we omit the re-definition in the statements in the following lemmas.
Lemma 4. For any optimistic execution E initialized with x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , let R be the destination of m * 2 ; for any P ∈ Ω\{R}, let m be the last message received by P before message m * 2 arrives its destination in E. By Corollary 3, m exists.
Let t be the status of P in E right after P receives m. Then for any execution E(P ) such that E(P ) is the same as E for P until P invokes Stop, and P invokes Stop with t after P receives m (and before P 's next receipt of some message), Stop returns z = f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) to P .
Proof.
For any E(P ), P 's behavior is the same as an honest P to the parties in Ω\{P } and T , w.l.o.g., we say that in E(P ), P is honest.
Let M P be the set of messages sent by P before m * 2 arrives its destination in E. Then the event of P receiving m is the last non-local event in E that might trigger P to send some message in M P . Due to the arbitrary delay of communication channels and the arbitrary time instant of invoking Stop, there exists such an execution E(P ) that P has sent all the messages in M P before P 's next receipt of some message and before P invokes Stop with t. For any such execution E(P ), the parties in Ω\{P } may continue E without noticing P 's invocation of Stop, and then an honest party R outputs z. Therefore, Stop should return z to P ; otherwise, as all parties are honest here, this violates the completeness property. Now due to the arbitrary time instant of invoking Stop, it is indistinguishable for T whether P , invoking Stop with t, has sent all the messages in M P or not. Therefore, for any E(P ), Stop has to return z to P . E and any k, 2 ≤ k ≤ n, w.l.o.g., let m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m k be k messages in E such that (a) the destination of
Lemma 5. For any optimistic execution
is the same as E for P i until P i invokes Stop; in E(P i ), P i invokes Stop with t i right before message m i arrives at P i .
Assume that for any E(P 1 ), if no other party invokes Stop before P 1 , then Stop returns ⊥ to P 1 . Then
• for k = 1, for any E(P k ), when P k invokes Stop, if no other party has invoked Stop, then
Stop returns ⊥ to P k .
• for k = 2, for any E(P k ), when P k invokes Stop, if P k−1 has invoked Stop with t k−1 , Stop has returned ⊥ to P k−1 and no other party has invoked Stop, then Stop returns ⊥ to P k except with negligible probability.
• for 3 ≤ k ≤ n, for any E(P k ), when P k invokes Stop if P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k−1 have invoked Stop with t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t k−1 respectively and for 2 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, P i invokes Stop after Stop returns to P i−1 , and Stop has returned ⊥ to P 1 , . . . , P k−1 , and no other party has invoked Stop, then Stop returns ⊥ to P k except with negligible probability.
Proof. Let E be initialized with x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n . We prove the lemma by induction. The base case, for which k = 1, is trivial. Suppose the statement is true for k − 1, 2 ≤ k ≤ n. Assume any E(P k ) as an execution such that when P k invokes Stop, P 1 , . . . , P k−1 have invoked Stop with t 1 , . . . , t k−1 respectively according to the statement, Stop has returned P 1 , . . . , P k−1 ⊥ and no other party has invoked Stop, and Stop returns r to P k , where r is a random variable.
For any E(P k ), let E * (P k ) be an execution that is the same as E(P k ) for P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n until P k invokes Stop right before message m k−1 arrives at P k−1 . If P j , . . . , P k−1 for some j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 do not invoke Stop before message m k−1 arrives at P k−1 in E(P k ), let P j , . . . , P k−1 invoke Stop right before message m k−1 arrives at P k−1 in the same order with the same status as in E * (P k ). Also, let P k invoke Stop after Stop has returned P k−1 ⊥.
Due to the arbitrary delay of communication channels, in both E(P k ) and E * (P k ), P k 's behavior is the same as an honest P k to Ω\P k and T . Hereafter we say that P k is honest. Again due to the arbitrary delay of communication channels,, to P k and T , any E * (P k ) is indistinguishable from any E(P k ) at the point when P k invokes Stop. Furthermore, since m k is the first message received by P k after P k−1 receives m k−1 in E, the status of P k in E * (P k ) is also t k . Thus in any E * (P k ), Stop returns r to P k (where the distribution of r remains the same).
For any E(P k−1 ) and for any E * (P k ), we define an execution F such that (a) F is the same as E(P k−1 ) for P k−1 until P k−1 invokes Stop with t k−1 right before m k−1 arrives at P k−1 ; (b) F is the same as E * (P k ) for P k until P k invokes Stop with t k right before m k−1 arrives at P k−1 ; (c) when P k invokes Stop, P 1 , . . . , P k−1 have invoked Stop with t 1 , . . . , t k−1 respectively and P i , 2 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 invokes Stop after Stop returns to P i−1 , Stop has returned ⊥ to P 1 , . . . , P k−2 and no other party has invoked Stop.
In F , P k−1 's behavior is the same as an honest P k−1 to Ω\{P k−1 } and T . Hereafter, we say that P k−1 is honest in F . If n = 2, then k = 2 and all parties are honest. Since the statement is true for k − 1, Stop returns ⊥ to P k−1 in F . Then by the completeness property, r = ⊥ with probability 1. If n > 2, since the statement is true for k − 1, then Stop returns ⊥ to P k−1 except with negligible probability. When Stop returns ⊥ to P k−1 , E * (P k ) and F are indistinguishable to T and P k due to the arbitrary delay of communication channels. As a result, Stop returns r to P k (where the distribution of r remains the same).
Then by the (weak) fairness property, r = ⊥ except with negligible probability. We can show this by contradiction. Suppose that r = ⊥ with non-negligible probability. We build an algorithm A such that (1) A controls all parties except for P k−1 and P k , and (2) A plays the asynchronous network and the roles of the malicious parties such that every execution among P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n satisfies F . A is a computationally-bounded algorithm such that two honest parties P k−1 and P k output differently with non-negligible probability. This violates the (weak) fairness property. A contradiction.
As a result, if the statement is true for k − 1, 2 ≤ k ≤ n, the statement is true for k. Therefore, the lemma is true for any k, 2 ≤ k ≤ n. Figure 2 illustrates the three key executions in the proof of lemma 5: Lemma 6. For any optimistic execution E, let R, a sequence of Ω, be the sequence of destinations of the messages received between the two events: the event of m * 1 arriving at its destination and the event of m * 2 arriving at its destination, inclusive. Then R contains all the permutations of Ω as subsequences. Proof . Let E be initialized with x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n . We prove by contradiction. Suppose that, w.l.o.g., R does not include P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n as a subsequence.
By Corollary 2, R starts at the destination of m * 1 and ends at the destination of m * 2 ; and R includes P 1 as a subsequence, which is also true for P 2 , . . . , P n . Then there exists some k, 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 such that R includes P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k as a subsequence and does not include P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k+1 as a subsequence.
As a result, there exists a sequence m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m k of k messages in E such that (a) the destination of m i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k is P i ; (b) m i+1 , 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 is the first message received by P i+1 after P i receives m i and (c) m 1 = m * 1 , or m 1 is the first message received by P 1 after m * 1 arrives at its destination; and (d) the event of m k arriving at P k precedes the event of m * 2 arriving at its destination. (The event of m k may also be the event of m * 2 .) Let t 1 be the status of P 1 right before P 1 receives m 1 in E. Define execution E(P 1 ) such that E(P 1 ) is the same as E for P 1 until P 1 invokes Stop with t 1 right before m 1 arrives at P 1 . By Lemma 2, for any E(P 1 ), if no other party invokes Stop before P 1 , then Stop returns ⊥ to P 1 .
Let t i , 2 ≤ i ≤ k be the status of P i right before P i receives m i in E. Define execution E(P k ) such that (a) E(P k ) is the same as E for P k until P k invokes Stop with t k right before message m k arrives at P k ; (b) P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k−1 invoke Stop with t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t k−1 respectively; (c) for 2 ≤ i ≤ k, P i invokes Stop after Stop returns to P i−1 ; (d) Stop returns ⊥ to P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k−1 ; and (5) no other party has invoked Stop. By Lemma 5, Stop returns ⊥ to P k in E(P k ) except with negligible probability.
Let m be the last message received by P k+1 before message m * 2 arrives at its destination in E. By Corollary 3, m exists if P k+1 is not the destination of m * 2 . Therefore, if P k+1 is not the destination of m * 2 , then the event of m arriving at its destination precedes the event of m k arriving at P k in E; otherwise, we have a subsequence P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k+1 , which gives a contradiction. Moreover, P k+1 is not the destination of m * 2 ; otherwise, we again have a subsequence P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k+1 , which gives a contradiction. (If the event of m k is the event of m * 2 , then the event of m arriving at its destination obviously precedes the event of m k arriving at P k in E.)
Let t k+1 be the status of P k+1 right after P k+1 receives m in E. Consider an execution E(P k , P k+1 ) that is the same as E(P k ) for all the parties in Ω\{P k+1 } and is the same as E for P k+1 until P k+1 invokes Stop with t k+1 after Stop has returned to P k . Since the event of m arriving at its destination precedes the event of message m k arriving at P k , in E(P k , P k+1 ), we let P k+1 invoke Stop with t k+1 also after P k+1 receives m.
In E(P k , P k+1 ), P k 's behavior is the same as an honest P k to Ω\{P k } and T ; P k+1 's behavior is the same as an honest P k+1 to Ω\{P k+1 } and T . Hereafter, we say that P k and P k+1 are honest in E(P k , P k+1 ). Moreover, until Stop returns to P k , E(P k , P k+1 ) and E(P k ) are indistinguishable to P k and T and therefore Stop returns ⊥ to P k except with negligible probability also in E(P k , P k+1 ). However, by Lemma 4 , Stop returns z = f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) to P k+1 . Now we build an algorithm A such that (1) A controls all parties except for P k−1 and P k , and (2) A plays the asynchronous network and the roles of the malicious parties such that every execution among P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n satisfies E(P k .P k+1 ). A is a computationally-bounded algorithm such that two honest parties P k and P k+1 output differently with non-negligible probability. This violates the (weak) fairness property. A contradiction. Figure 3 illustrates two key executions in the proof of Lemma 6: E(P k ), E(P k , P k+1 ). Now that we have all the necessary properties of any optimistic execution, we are ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let R be defined as in Lemma 6 . Then by Lemma 6 , lower-bounds the length of R. By the definition of m * 1 , there are at least n − 2 messages that precede m * 1 in E; otherwise, at least one party has not yet contacted the destination of m * 1 . By the definition of m * 2 , there are at least n − 1 messages that follow m * 2 in E; otherwise, at least one party P cannot compute z from P 's input and P 's status.
Therefore, during any optimistic execution E, the number of messages sent is at least + 2n − 3.
Remark 1 (Honest behavior in an execution). Usually without a protocol specification, we cannot define any honest behavior. In the proof of Theorem 1, the honest behavior is relative to an optimistic execution.
B Appendix. Proof of Theorem 3
We give here a detailed proof of Theorem 3. We note that this is a proof of a stand-alone execution. This is consistent with Definition 3, which defines an isolated (n + 1)-party case of optimistic fair computation.
Before we present the proof, we recall the formal definition and security guarantee of verifiable encryption from [12] .
Definition 6 (Verifiable encryption [12] ). Let (G, E, D) be the key generation, encryption and decryption algorithms of a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme. Let (vk, sk) be one key pair generated by G where vk is the public key and sk is the secret key. Let R be a relation and let L R = {x|∃w such that (x, w) ∈ R}. A verifiable encryption scheme for a relation R consists of a two-party protocol (P, V ) and a recovery algorithm D. P and V take as common inputs: vk, x, R (and some condition κ to open string α). P takes witness w such that (x, w) ∈ R as an extra input. V rejects (i.e., outputs ⊥), or accepts and obtains string α. D takes as inputs: sk, α (and κ). D outputs a witnessŵ if κ is verified.
A verifiable encryption scheme is secure if it satisfies the following properties:
• Completeness: If P and V are honest, then V accepts in the two-party protocol for all (vk, sk) and for all x ∈ L R .
• Validity: For any computationally-bounded algorithmP , for all (vk, sk), if V accepts and obtains string α in the two-party protocol withP , then given α and sk, D outputs a witnesŝ w such that (x,ŵ) / ∈ R with negligible probability.
• Computational zero-knowledge: For every algorithmV , there exists an expected polynomialtime simulator S given vk and x, and with black-box access toV such that for all x ∈ L R , the output ofV after the two-party protocol with an honest P is computationally indistinguishable from the output of S.
Furthermore, for the simplicity of the proof, we consider the particular verifiable encryption scheme proposed in [12] . As [12] pointed out, their construction of verifiable encryption can be made non-interactive via Fiat-Shamir heuristic [38] ; the resulting non-interactive variant is secure in the random oracle model [39] . For the non-interactive variant, it is easy to see that the algorithm V in the scheme is deterministic; i.e., given the one message sent byP , either V rejects (with probability 1) or V accepts (with probability 1); and the recovery algorithm D in the scheme is also deterministic; i.e., given sk, κ and α, either D rejects (with probability 1) or D outputs a witness (with probability 1).
Proof of Theorem 3. As shown in Algorithm 1, the number of messages is equal to the length of sequence j which is l + 2n − 3. Thus the n parties exchange exactly l + 2n − 3 messages in π. In what follows, we verify that our protocol satisfies Definition 3 and Definition 4.
Optimism. If P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n are honest and none invokes Stop, then all parties follow π in which all parties output z = f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) without interacting with T .
Non-triviality. As shown in Algorithm 1, if messages are delivered instantly, then P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n do not invoke Stop; therefore, we find one execution of π that P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n are honest and none invokes Stop.
Completeness. If P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n are honest and none invokes Stop, then all parties follow π and output z = f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ). Next, we show by contradiction that if all parties are honest and some invokes Stop, then either all parties output ⊥ or all parties output z = f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ). Suppose that an honest party P outputs ⊥ and an honest party Q outputs z. Since P outputs ⊥, then either (1) π has not started, or (2) P = P j k and 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, or (3) P = P j k and n ≤ k ≤ l + 2n − 3 For cases (1) and (2), since by Equation (2),
P has not sent V E j k . Again by Equation (2), m end(j k ) = m end(j k )−1 ||x j k ||Sig j k (m end(j k )−1 ||x j k ).
Since end(j k ) > n − 1, P has not sent x j k . Since all parties are honest, Q does not output z from running π or µ in cases (1) and (2). In case (3), since all parties are honest, by the completeness property of verifiable encryption, and the definition of digital signatures, T accepts that req k and P = P j k 's claim are consistent. As P is honest, P has not sent a request before. In case (3), we consider two disjoint cases: (a) ∃i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, V E i is not in req k , and (b) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, V E i is in req k .
Consider case (3.a). By Equation (2), ∀ix ≥ n − 1, m ix contains V E 1 , V E 2 , . . . , V E n . Then 0 ≤ last k ≤ n − 2. Since j 0 , j 1 , . . . , j n−1 are different from each other, j k = j n−1 . Moreover, k = min ix∈{n,n+1,...,l+2n−3} {ix|j ix = j k } ≤ end(j k ). Therefore, P has not sent x j k , and Q cannot output x j k following π.
Clearly, if Q does not interact with T , then Q outputs ⊥, and furthermore, if Q interacts with T before P interacts with T , then Q also outputs ⊥. If Q interacts with T after P interacts with T , then we assume that Q sends a request reto T . Since Q is honest, T accepts that reis consistent with Q's claim that Q has not received m q−1 (but has received m lastq−1 ). By the definition of i, q ≤ endj q . (Otherwise, we do not have j k , j q as a subsequence of i). In addition, since Q is honest, q ≤ min ix∈{k+1,k+2,...,l+2n−3} {ix|j ix = j q }. Therefore, T sends "aborted" to Q.
In case (3.b), w.l.o.g., assume that P is the earliest process that sends to T a request and receives "aborted". Then variable progress is 0 at T when P sends req k . Then we have k ≤ min ix∈{1,2,...,l+2n−3} {ix|j ix = j k } f irst(j k ).
If j k = j 0 , k ≤ n − 1, which gives a contradiction. If j k = j 0 , then since k ≤ f irst(j k ), last k = 0; thus req k = m last k = V E j 0 , which also gives a contradiction for n ≥ 2.
Termination. As shown in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, an honest party either follows π and outputs, or wants to stop, follows µ and outputs. Since any message between an honest party and T eventually reaches its destination, an honest party eventually outputs.
Fairness. We prove that for any e ∈ N, 1 ≤ e ≤ n − 1, any e malicious parties P d 1 , P d 2 , . . . , P de , and any computationally-bounded algorithm A, there exists a computationally-bounded algorithm S such that the joint outputs O P 1 ,P 2 ,...,Pn,A (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) and OP 1 ,P 2 ,...,Pn,S (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) are computationally indistinguishable for any x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n . We construct S that runs A as a black-box as follows.
1. S generates n+1 key pairs (pk 1 , sk 1 ), (pk 2 , sk 2 ), . . . , (pk n , sk n ), (vk T , sk T ); and then S invokes A and initializes A with inputs x d 1 , x d 2 , . . . , x de , n+1 parties' public keys pk 1 , pk 2 , . . . , pk n , pk T and malicious parties' private keys sk d 1 , sk d 2 , . . . , sk de . 16 2. S plays the role of the n − k honest parties P h 1 , P h 2 , . . . , P h n−e and T , and executes our protocol honestly with A except that:
• If by Algorithm 1, S has to send the (k−1)th message for 1 ≤ k ≤ n on behalf of an honest party, then by the construction of Fiat-Shamir paradigm [38] and the computational zeroknowledge property of verifiable encryption, S can simulate the random oracle [39] and invoke the simulator (defined in the computational zero-knowledge property) to compute messagem k−1 (that is computationally indistinguishable from the (k − 1)th message except with negligible probability).
• If by Algorithm 1, S has to send the (k−1)th message for end(j k−1 )+1 ≤ k ≤ l+n−2 on behalf of an honest party P src , then 
